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BELGIUM, A LABORATORY FOR EUROPE: 
THE FEDERAL MODEL AND THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 
Claire Lobet-Maris 
B&rice van Bastelaer 
Abstract - This paper presents the main political information superhighway 
(NH) initiatives undertaken in Belgium, a small but centrally located Euro- 
pean member state. Belgium is a federal state with regions and communities 
whose competences concerning multimedia and ISHs are not clearly defined. 
This paper shows that this fuzzy situation slows down ISHs’ development in 
Belgium and reveals the weakness of a federal pattern for the definition and 
management of a coherent ISH strategy. Belgium has two main cultures which 
express themselves in the initiatives taken at the northern and southern parts 
of the country. These examples reveal that the use of ISHs to express national 
cultures and identities, and the cohesive effect of ISHs on European member 
states, underlined by the Bangemann report, may be contradictory. Copyright 
0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd 
INTRODUCTION 
Belgium is a federal state composed of three regions and three com- 
munities. As a federal state, Belgium is often presented as a relevant pattern for poli- 
tical cooperation between the European Union (EU) member states. In the context of 
the Bangemann report (EC, 1994) promoting the political cohesion of Europe through 
information superhighways (ISHs), it sounds relevant to deeply analyse the Belgian 
initiatives and strategies. Indeed, to some extent, Belgium could be considered as a 
pertinent laboratory for testing the EU’s capacity to launch and manage cohesive 
strategies while respecting regional identities. In this paper we will demonstrate that, in 
the specific field of ISHs, the Belgian federal pattern appears quite inappropriate for 
bringing a cohesive strategy to a successful conclusion. To some extent, one could say 
that the ISH project points out the weaknesses of the federal model. 
Two main barriers, heavily interconnected, seem to prevent the shaping of a national 
strategy for a Belgian information society. 
The first barrier is political, mainly due to deep regional disparities (linguistic, eco- 
nomic, cultural, etc.) and to the subsequent regionalist claims of some political leaders. 
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In this context, the build-up of a cohesive strategy at a federal level appears hard to 
manage because of the difficulty of combining the shaping of a national strategy with 
the willingness to foster regional identities. As we will see later in this paper, in Bel- 
gium, the Bangemann report (EC, 1994) has given rise to a mosaic of highly frag- 
mented and incoherent initiatives, partly supported by regionalist intentions and partly 
by the personal ambitions of some political leaders. This questions the economics of 
the innovation process in a federal state, and especially the general statement of the 
Bangemann report about the impact of ISHs on European cohesion. This statement 
appears marked by a strong technological determinism. The Belgian example shows 
that political issues and tensions shape the future of the ISHs and not the reverse. As 
pointed out by Francis Pave (1990), a technological project can never solve political 
issues, since those issues need political solutions. 
The second barrier is institutional. As a federal state, Belgium is characterized by a 
complex distribution of administrative competences between different political levels. This 
division of powers has been progressively shaped according to some well-established 
domains of political life (economy, culture, social, etc.) and is currently based on sensitive 
compromises between the political parties. The political issues occur when a project does 
not fit with these well-established categories. This is clearly the case for the ISH project 
since it concerns a multitude of administrative bodies and thus needs their cooperation. 
But, in Belgium, rather than stimulating this necessary cooperation, the ISH project tends 
to emphasize divisions. In fact, the ISHs idea has launched what could become a contlict of 
competences. Indeed, each level of authority, supported by various political interests and 
ambitions, is willing to protect and to extent its competence in order to get a foothold in 
the shaping of ISHs and to appear as a innovator on the Belgian political scene. This 
strategy can be explained by the political context which is mainly characterized by a strong 
recession and the total absence of political projects for the future of Belgian society. In this 
context, the Bangemann initiative is attractive since it fills a political gap with a “pseudo” 
project for a radically new society, the so-called “information society”. Rationally, many 
observers would like more cooperation and coordination of efforts between the concerned 
authorities. But what is rational from a pure economic and technical point of view appears 
to be politically unworkable in Belgium. 
In this paper, we first sketch the Belgian context, focusing our attention on its major 
economic, cultural and political characteristics. Then, we question the current federal 
division of competences regarding the regulation of the ISH project and related new mul- 
timedia services. This analysis will point out the complexity of our federal organization 
and its incapacity to carry out a clear and cohesive strategy. The third section is devoted to 
the presentation of the main political initiatives at the federal and regional levels. This 
analysis shows that the ISH project does not reinforce the cohesion of the Belgian society 
but, on the contrary, intensifies regional and political divisions. Finally, we focus on the 
main debates launched by the Bangemann report in Belgium and on a general assessment 
of the major statements of this report regarding the Belgian experience. 
THE BELGIAN CONTEXT 
The political and Belgian context: towards a federal Belgium 
Since 1993, the Belgian constitution states that “Belgium is a federal state composed 
of communities and regions”. Four legal reforms were implemented in 1970, 1980, 
1988-89 and 1993 to reach this federal status. The federal state is responsible for the 
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general concerns of all Belgian citizens (finances, army, justice, social security, external 
affairs, development cooperation, monetary policy, responsibilities within the EU and 
NATO,...‘), while the division of competences between communities and regions is 
defined along two main axes.2 The first axis concerns language and, more generally, 
culture. As Belgium has three official languages (French, Dutch and German), it also 
has three communities that are defined by the “people who compose them and the links 
that join these people”3, that is to say, language and culture. Therefore, Belgium is 
composed of the French-speaking community, the Dutch-speaking or Flemish com- 
munity and the German-speaking community (the smallest one). The division into 
regions is based on economic autonomy and independence. Belgium has three regions: 
the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital Region. These 
regions are competent for economic matters. In some respects, they can be compared 
with the American states and to the German LBnders.4 
Each entity (region and community) has a council (legislative body) and a govern- 
ment (executive body), except the Flemish Region and community which have a com- 
mon council and government. 
The economic and cultural context 
Belgium is a small country (30,500 km2), bounded on the North by The Netherlands, 
on the East by Germany and Luxemburg and, on the South, by France. It is situated at 
the heart of Europe, in a historically dynamic economic region. Trade is an important 
aspect of the Belgian economy’ because of the small interior market and the integration 
of Belgium in the Benelux in 1958 and later in the Common Market and the EU. 
Moreover, Belgium has always been and continues to be one of the most eager builders 
of Europe (Dehaene, 1995) and is often presented as the model of a federal state with 
relatively pacific coexistence of different cultures and languages (Dehaene, 1995; Lij- 
phart, 1981). The continuous Belgian commitment towards a federal EU is due to a 
political and popular will. This move towards Europe has never been subject to a 
referendum in Belgium because it is almost never called into question by Belgian citi- 
zens. However, the increasing liberal move within the European economy and policies 
is moderated in Belgium, as in Germany, by a well-established social tradition of 
negotiation between trade unions, the employers’ organization and the government, 
especially on employment questions. 
As in many other European countries, the Belgian economy is mainly based on 
services,6 while most industrial sectors face an economic recession, especially in the 
Walloon Region. Economic differences between the northern and the southern parts of 
the country, strengthened by the present slump and the increasing unemployment rate7 





5Exports account for more than 70% of GDP (Dehaene, 1995) and Belgium is the 10th biggest world exporting 
country for products and the 8th for services Olttp://www.belgium.be/belgium). 
61n 1986, services account for 64.8% of the Belgian GDP (Federation des Entreprises de Belgique, 
1988:145). 
‘13.2% of the active population (Institut des Comptes Nationaux-Bureau Federal du Plan, 1996:4). 
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Belgium is more and more a culturally divided society with two main regions, two main 
languages and two economies. 
Belgium is characterized by a huge public debt’ that induces highly restricting 
economic measures and cuts in public expenses in order to satisfy the Maastricht con- 
vergence conditions’ and enter the Monetary Union. The importance of the interest 
charges reduces the latitude of the Belgian government in the definition of policy prio- 
rities (Dehaene, 1995). Belgian policy is thus mainly directed towards the management 
of this public deficit, the reestablishment of the firms’ competitiveness and the reduc- 
tion of unemployment. However, because of these economic priorities, there seems to 
have no long-term policies regarding education, improvement of the public service 
efficiency, definition of the public service or engagement towards an information 
society. 
Being the capital of Europe (thus a central place for lobbying) but also centrally 
located geographically speaking, Brussels attracts a lot of international companies.” 
This is also the case for many telecom companies” and the proximity of the complete 
liberalization of the European telecom market in 1998 speeds up this movement. The 
Belgian market seems thus to be more and more attractive for these companies, who 
consider Belgium as a battlefield for the professional telecom market (big companies) 
but are not interested in the final users market which is too limited. 
MULTIMEDIA AND ISHs COMPETENCES IN BELGIUM 
In Belgium, as in other federal states (Germany, Switzerland), this complex and 
fuzzy political context is surely one of the main factor that slows down the rise and the 
dynamism of the multimedia market as several institutions are responsible for the 
regulation of new multimedia services and their infrastructures. 
Infrastructures: new landscapes and borderlines 
Traditionally, the Belgian landscape of network infrastructures was organized 
around two separated worlds: the telecommunication infrastructure and the TV cable 
network. Telecom networks are regulated by the federal authority and the CATV 
infrastructure by the communities’* because of cultural issues. According to Minon 
(1996), two main factors will contribute to spread confusion into the traditional bor- 
derlines between these two worlds. The first factor is the telecommunication infra- 
structure’s liberalization, which opens the telecommunication market to alternative 
‘More than BF10,OOO billion (USS333 billion), almost 130% of the Belgian GDP (Bureau du Plan, 
1994:24). 
9Mainly the requirement of a budget deficit inferior or equal to 3% of the GDP and a total debt of maxi- 
mum 60% of the GDP. 
“More than 1,500 international organizations are established in Belgium, some of them have their 
international headquarters in Brussels (European Commission, NATO,...) (Federation des Entreprises de 
Belfique, 1988). Many of these organizations are coordination and distribution centers (Dehaene, 1995). 
’ British Telecom, Global One (consortium created by France Telecom Network Services, Deutsche 
Telekom and Sprint), Esprit Telccom, Unisource, Telecom Finland,... (Hart, 1995). 
‘*As explained by Minon (1996) different laws have progressively widened the competences of the com- 
munities from a simple regulation of the cultural contents of broadcast services to the full regulation of the 
contents and their infrastructures, (mainly but not exclusively through the cable network). 
Belgium, a laboratory model for Europe 85 
infrastructures. The second element concerns the digitalization technique that will 
foster the competition between telecommunication and alternative infrastructures 
since, in a foreseeable future, each infrastructure will be technically able to offer the 
same range of digital services. 
Telecommunication infrastructure and basic services13 are currently under the 
monopoly of the Belgian telecommunication operator, Belgacom, until January 1998. 
In order to consolidate Belgacom’s strategic position, the federal state has opened 
Belgacom’s capital to a new entrant, the ADSB consortium formed by Ameritech, Tele 
Denmark and Singapore Telecom. This strategic alliance was concluded in November 
1995 as a first stage of Belgacom’s competitive strategy in the context of liberalization 
of the alternative and traditional telecommunication infrastructures. 
In this liberalization context, the federal Belgian government was the first European 
member state to vote a special rule concerning universal service provision. In the frame 
law (“loi-programme”) of 20 December 1995, the federal government defined specific 
mechanisms to finance universal service, based on an obligatory contribution of tele- 
corn operators and service providers. On this issue, Belgium has adopted an innovative 
attitude by refusing to restrict the concept of universal service to the sole telephone 
services. This position has isolated Belgium on the European scene, the Eu having 
adopted a highly restrictive definition of universal service (Dermine, 1996). 
Concerning the TV cable network, the infrastructure is currently under a de facto 
monopoly of local agencies usually owned by the communes with or without private 
partners. The communities are fully competent to regulate the diffusion of broadcast 
services on the TV cable network. The main characteristics of this CATV network are, 
on the one hand, its high penetration rate (95% of Belgian households) and, on the 
other hand, its important fragmentation since each local network is managed and 
controlled by a specific local agency. With this high penetration level, the TV cable 
network is presented as the main alternative infrastructure to the traditional tele- 
communication network in the context of the new European directives14 of November 
95 and February 96 concerning, respectively, the liberalization of the CATV network 
and of other alternative infrastructures. 
Services: who is competent? Communities or regions? 
In Belgium, new multimedia services raise a particular legal problem linked to the 
definition of the legal framework to be applied to the supply of these services. Tradi- 
tionally, in the Belgian law, a distinction is made between broadcast services,15 which 
are regarded as cultural matters and therefore regulated by the communities and 
interpersonal services linked to the telecom infrastructure and thus dependent on the 
federal authority. In the past, frontiers were clear between radio and television on the 
one hand and telephone on the other. These framework differences were therefore not 
13Telephone, telex, radiomail, telegraph and fixed lines. 
14According to this directive, owners of alternative infrastructures may open their network to tele- 
communication commercial services, except for telephone and basic services which will be liberalized in Jan- 
tray 1998. 
’ Broadcast services can be. defined as services whose emission is due to be received by the “audience in 
general” (State Council decision) or by the “public in general or a part of it” (decree of 17 July 1987). This 
definition is difficult to apply to new multimedia services as explained by Minon (199650): “The apparition of 
pay-per-view services, near video on demand and then video on demand will probably shake this definition”. 
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so important. But nowadays, this situation is less and less coherent since all types of 
service, through digitalization, may be supported by many kinds of infrastructure. 
Similar services may then receive a different legal treatment given the supporting 
infrastructure or the concerned governing authority. 
As long as the Belgian regulatory framework remains fuzzy regarding the definition 
of concepts and the delimitation of competences, conflicts will subsist on the legal and 
political levels. Such competences conflicts will perhaps have a negative effect in the 
long-range on the Belgian multimedia market despite the rather exceptional cable situa- 
tion in Belgium (as this could not be extensively exploited). The solution to this problem, 
according to Willems, GCrard, Poullet, and Queck (1995), is probably a clear division of 
infrastructure and services regulation aspects and the creation of a unique regulatory 
institution for each of these elements. However, this technical and rational solution will 
probably have little chance to succeed given the Belgian political landscape. 
THE POLITICAL INITIATIVES 
Initiatives at the federal level 
As quoted before, the Belgian federal authority remains fully competent for tele- 
communication infrastructure and services. Despite its competence, the federal 
authority has been relatively absent in the field of ISHs. As we will see later on, many 
reasons explain this absence of strategy, amongst them the dominance in the federal 
agenda of the public debt problem and the search for solutions for reducing this debt, 
and of the important unemployment rate. 
The privatization of the national telecom operator 
At the Belgian federal level, the Bangemann report (EC, 1994) did not give rise to 
important debates and projects because, as already mentioned, since some years, the 
federal agenda in the economic field has mainly been dominated by two major issues. 
The first one, in line with the Delors White Paper on growth, competitiveness and 
employment (EC, 1993), concerns the social negotiation of a new global agreement for 
employment. The second issue regards Belgacom’s privatization. To some extent, the 
focus on these two issues reveals that the federal authorities perceive one of the real 
purposes of the Bangemann report, that is to say the claim for an accelerated agenda in 
the liberalization of telecommunication infrastructures. It also shows that the Belgian 
authorities feel that this report was an inappropriate response to one of the major 
European challenge: the social crisis. 
So, regarding ISHs, the major initiative of the federal level concerns the privatization 
process of Belgacom. This process was carried out rapidly according to a very swift 
agenda. Launched in mid-1994, the process was brought to a successful conclusion in 
December 1995 through the selling of 49.9% of Belgacom’s capital to ADSB. 
Three main reasons explain this rapid process. 
The first one is the 1998 term. As explained before, Belgium’s central position makes 
this rather tight internal market very attractive for telecommunication operators, since 
many headquarters of private and public companies are located in Brussels. The per- 
spective of telecom general liberalization in 1998 claimed urgently for a reinforcement 
of the competitive position of the national operator, particularly on the professional 
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market on which new entrants are already present, as Global One, British Telecom, 
Unisource, etc. But the danger for the national telecom operator comes also from new 
domestic entrants like CATV operators, since the July 96 European directive authori- 
zes the commercial exploitation of “non-reserved” services on alternative infra- 
structures. In that context, Belgacom’s privatization could also be interpreted as a 
strategy to reinforce the federal position in front of some regional- or community- 
based strategies promoting alternative infrastructures, like Telenet, that will be 
explained later in this paper. 
More prosaically, the privatization of Belgacom (as with that of other public agen- 
cies) may ease the weight of the huge public debt because privatizations are unique 
operations that could bring the amount of the debt closer to the 60% of GDP required 
by the Maastricht conditions (Dehaene, 1995). 
ADSB’s motivation can be explained by the fact that the consortium joins “forces 
with a company that is the dominant player in the European Union’s capital-a prime 
location for the European headquarters of international companies and a springboard 
for possible expansion into neighbouring France and Germany” (Tucker, 1995). This 
motivation justifies the overexpected price offered by ADSB to get 50% minus one 
share of Belgacom in spite of the fact that the state telecom company suffered from 
poor performance and chaotic management. In this alliance, the ADSB consortium 
brings its experience in the field of telecom and multimedia services, especially for the 
professional markets and electronic commerce. 
This process was very “sensitive in Belgium where public sector unions are wary of 
the government’s privatization ambitions” (Tucker, 1995). Employment, flexible 
working practices, wage freeze and status damages were the main concerns of the 
26,000 workers of Belgacom. In spite of promises and guarantees made by the gov- 
ernment and accepted by the ADSB consortium to maintain the current rate of 
employment until the end of 1997, trade unions are worried about possible redundan- 
cies before this term regarding the past experiences of Ameritech, Tele Denmark and 
Singapore Telecom. 
Universal service: the Belgian way to liberalization 
As quoted before, the federal Belgian government was the first European member 
state to vote a special law concerning universal service provision. In the “loi-pro- 
gramme” of 20 December 1995, the federal government considered specific mechanisms 
to fund universal service, based on an obligatory contribution of telecom operators and 
service providers. In this “loi-programme”, the Belgian federal government has adop- 
ted an evolutive and extended concept of universal service, not restricted to the non- 
profitable segments of the telephone, fax and file transfer markets, as stated by the 
European Commission (EC). The Belgian law aims at extending the coverage of uni- 
versal service to all telecommunication services of public interests for schools, admin- 
istrations, disabled people, elderly, etc. (Lauwers, 1996). This quite innovative position 
has isolated Belgium on the European scene, the EU promoting a very liberal and 
restricted concept of universal service (Dermine). 
On the Belgian scene, it has also launched a deep conflict between the federal and 
Flemish governments, the latter having adopted the same restricted concept of uni- 
versal service as the EU. However, the conflict is more economic and political than 
purely conceptual. In this conflict, the Flemish government accuses the federal state of 
protectionism in favor of Belgacom by entrusting it with the mission of ensuring 
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universal service in Belgium (Lauwers, 1996). One must admit that the law under cur- 
rent discussion is considering the possibility to give this mission to a telecom operator 
that has the best national coverage and already an experience in managing such 
“social” services, namely Belgacom (Lauwers, 1996). For the Flemish government, this 
statement is clearly in opposition to the European competition law and the ongoing 
process of liberalization of the telecom sector. This conflict about universal service is 
very representative of a general conflict between two levels of power in Belgium, the 
federal level trying to protect federal interests, in this case those of its state telecom 
company, and the Flemish level trying to push its regional strategy and to defend the 
Telenet alternative infrastructure’s project which will be explained later. 
Public administration: a weak investment in ISHs 
In its very market-driven approach, the Bangemann report stresses the leverage effect 
that the public sector, being by nature a critical mass of potential users, could have on 
the market of ISHs. This pure market consideration is of course more positively pre- 
sented in the Bangemann report, focusing on “more efficient, transparent and respon- 
sive public services, closer to the citizens and at lower costs” (EC, 19945). Here again, 
it seems important to underline the strong technological determinism of this report, 
and to strongly insist on the fact that, to our knowledge, a technology has never 
transformed, by itself, a rigid bureaucracy into a flexible adhocracy! Apart from this 
consideration, one must recognize that in Belgium, the public sector does not play a 
leading role in general. 
Three main issues can explain this weak investment. The first issue, already explained 
before, concerns the dramatic public debt of Belgium which prevents public authorities 
from realizing major investments in new technologies and services. The current time is 
more devoted to a large agenda of rationalization and privatization of public bodies 
than to modernization of public administrations.i6 Secondly, the successive legal 
reforms to shape the federal status of the state have created a very unstable adminis- 
trative context, quite inappropriate to large organizational and technological changes. 
Finally, the relative turnover of the Belgian government and ministers appears as a 
major barrier for long-term changes and investments since, paradoxically, deep chan- 
ges need a high political stability to succeed. The result of this situation is a quasi-total 
absence of public investments17 and plans to foster the use of ISHs related services in 
public administrations. The sole initiatives are rather short term and often marked by 
motivations of some ministers willing to promote a modern self-image. 
R&D: the European path 
Federal competences in R&D concern fundamental research and exceptionally more 
applied research in domains of national interest. Considering ISHs as a domain of 
‘6Except perhaps the Bistel project, funded by the federal government, which concerns the setting-up of a 
database server with administrative and news information necessary to take political decisions. 
“It is probably worthwhile to mention the federal investment in Belnet, the academic and research net- 
work, use of which is still free for universities because it is funded by the government (almost BFIOO million 
per year-USS3.33 million). 
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national interest, the federal science policy department (OSTC) launched in 1994 a 
scientific program for telecommunications diffusion. 
The objective of this federal research program was the “stimulation of telematics 
technologies use” (Services du Premier Ministre-Affaires Scientifiques, Techniques et 
Culturelles, 1996a:2) into specific users, that is, users that are usually not considered as 
target public by the commercial applications (i.e., the non-profit sector, the SMEs and 
the liberal professions). The OSTC more specifically supports projects including federal 
administrations or federal scientific and cultural institutions. This program has three 
specific axes: the development of targeted pilot applications, the constitution of an 
interdisciplinary expertise basis and a forum for telecom use. 
This program mirrors the main European R&D initiatives of the 4th framework Euro- 
pean program. It is built on the same technological options pushing the ISDN technology 
and the ATM protocols. It focuses on the development of demonstration platforms spe- 
cially in domains of public and non-profit interest, following the same orientations as the 
EU Telematics program. But one of the major differences with the European orientations 
concerns the emphasis on socioeconomic research through the second axis of the program: 
“Constitution of an interdisciplinary expertise basis”. The objective of this second axis is 
the setting-up of a “coherent and multidisciplinary scientific expertise basis in Belgium on 
all the factors conditioning the diffusion of telematics applications into specific users” 
(Services du Premier Ministre-Atfaires Scientifiques, Techniques et Culturelles, 1996b: 1). 
This positively shows the willingness to address specific social, economic, legal and 
cultural issues regarding the shaping of the so-called information society. It is worth 
underlining the dominance of legal issues in this program. This dominance is not 
proper to this specific program but concerns more widely the Belgian public debate on 
ISHs. To some extent, this debate appears entirely captured by legal and technical 
engineering issues while fundamental debates on social aspects, for example, are 
pushed out of the limelight. 
Concerning the demonstration platforms supported by this program, they “demon- 
strate” clearly the lack of imagination in the field of ISHs applications. Most of them 
concern rather classical process innovations based on the experimentation of network 
solutions for administrative or associative organizations. Again, this is not proper to 
this specific program. The same statement can be established for the EU Telematics 
program. This questions the optimistic assertion of the Bangemann report about the 
positive effect of ISHs on jobs’ creation since the economic analysis shows clearly that 
this positive scenario is highly conditioned by the development of radical product or 
service innovation (Delhaye, Lobet-Maris, & van Bastelaer, 1996). 
initiatives at the Flemish level 
Let us recall that in Flanders, there is only one council and one government. Com- 
petences and initiatives are therefore less divided than in the Walloon Region and 
French-speaking community. Concretely, this Flemish council has lead the initiative, 
following Delors’ White Paper and the Bangemann report, of developing an ISH pro- 
ject for a modern Flanders radically turned towards the future. This project of “Mul- 
timedia in Vlaanderen”, formally presented in April 1996 (Vlaamse Regering, 1996) is 
mainly based upon the Telenet Vlaanderen project and aims at developing a Flemish 
information society for several reasons (Vlaamse Regering, 1996:7-10). First of all, the 
multimedia sector is presented as being turned towards the future and strategically 
important for the development of Flanders. Secondly, according to the Flemish 
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government, multimedia and the information society will provide net job creation.18 
“Multimedia in Vlaanderen” also emphasizes the need of a Flemish anchoring in the 
multimedia sector and underlines, as the Bangemann report does, the potentiality of 
ISHs and society in the promotion of the Flemish culture and language. The project also 
takes as leading multimedia applications the 10 applications promoted by the Bange- 
mann report (teleworking, teleshopping, distance learning, . . . ). Finally, the report 
stresses the necessity to guarantee the access to the information society to all Flemish 
people in order to avoid a dual society but, visibly not to avoid a dual Belgium! 
This document expressing views of the Flemish government strongly shows that Flan- 
ders has followed main Bangemann report’s statements and it really seems, that, in Bel- 
gium, the Bangemann report has been most echoed in the northern part of the country. 
“Multimedia in Vlaanderen” clearly expresses the involvement of the Flemish government 
into the “Bangemann move”, especially the European-pushed process of telecom liberal- 
ization and the need for a proactive position in that field (Vlaamse Regering, 1996:9). It also 
denotes regionalist views of a Flemish information society (Abrahams, 1995) and con- 
stitutes a new way of claiming a long-lasting Flemish will of autonomy and independence. 
The main element of “Multimedia in Vlaanderen” is the Telenet Vlaanderen project. 
A consortium has been formed for developing this project and is composed of the 
northern TV cable distributors, the Flemish government through its regional invest- 
ment society (Gimv) and the American US West. The project aims at building a fully 
interconnected alternative digital infrastructure, based on the CATV network and 
competing with the Belgacom infrastructure. The project is above all political and if the 
political vision is clear, the economic’s plan of the project remain highly uncertain. 
Telenet’s profitability is indeed heavily doubtful”: it implies huge costs2’ and the ben- 
efits, if any, are risky and difficult to estimate. Moreover, the target market is the tele- 
phone services on the cable but, concerning phone services, Belgacom has an important 
installed basis. But, principally, Telenet Vlaanderen suffers from a lack of killing multi- 
media applications. This lack of killing applications and the uncertain return on invest- 
ment make the search for economic partners difficult. In fact, since the launch of the project 
in Autumn 1994, partners retire more and more from the project and in May 1996 the 
holding was not yet firmly established, although announced several times (Simon, 1996). 
At the regional level, the Flemish Region also launched R&D actions on the infra- 
structure level as well as on the services level. The R&D policy mainly consists of the 
Action Program in Information Technology, a multimedia fund and the Medialab 
project. The Action Program in Information Technology, endowed with BF1150 mil- 
lion (US$38.3 million) is mainly designed for firms and research centers and has five 
main application fields: programs on demand, teleworking, edutainment (education 
and entertainment), mobile communication for transport and multimedia process con- 
trol (Vlaamse Regering, 1996:28-29). The multimedia fund aims at providing risk 
capital via the Flemish regional investment society for the development of new services 
on the cable network or on PSTN in order to protect or affirm the Flemish culture 
(Vlaamse Regering, 1996:31). The third important part of the R&D Flemish policy, 
called Medialab, is the setting-up, as in the federal research program, of an expertise 
“Different reports, since the Bangemann report, have been mostly doubtful about this statement (Delhaye, 
Lobet-Mark, & van Bastelaer, 1996; EC, 1996). 
“Mercer Management, an American consultancy office specializing in telecommunications, has indeed 
declared, in August 1995, that this project will be a financial disaster (“Teienet, une catastrophe?‘, 1995). 
“Estimated at BF50 billion (USS1.667 billion) (Simon, 1996) especially for the fiber optic infrastructure 
and the FTTH (Fiber to the Home) technique that has to be implemented. 
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network in IT but more specially on the socio-economic aspects of multimedia 
applications with four main priorities: teleworking, on-line multimedia training, on-line 
information access and diffusion, and teleshopping (Vlaamse Regering, 1996:33-34). 
The Bangemann report presented ISHs as having a cohesive effect on the European 
member states but also as being a way of expressing national cultures and identities. The 
Flemish example seems to reveal that these two elements may be contradictory, because the 
will to express national cultures and identities is often linked to nationalist views of inde- 
pendence that do not necessarily lead to a better cohesion between regions and countries. 
Initiatives at the French-speaking levels 
Unlike the Flemish case, there is no political unity in the French-speaking part of 
Belgium allowing a unique initiative in the multimedia field, perhaps because the feel- 
ing of a regional identity is less present in Wallonia. But the main explanations for the 
lack of policy initiatives in the southern part of the country lie in the separation of 
powers and the conflict of competences that prevent the design of a coherent strategy 
concerning multimedia and convergence. The ISHs debate only prolongs existing ten- 
sions and conflicts between regional and community levels but on a new field. Moreover, 
the weak economic situation of Wallonia reduces investment capacities of political 
authorities as well as of firms. Concerning the cable infrastructure, the owners of the 
network are local companies which have less power than the Flemish firms. In this con- 
text, there is no federative project like Telenet Vlaanderen but some separate and some- 
times overlapping initiatives between partners which are not always objective allies. 
The first example of these initiatives is TITAN (Televisual Interactive Terminal 
Associates Networks), a consortium set up in 1993 by the French-speaking community 
in order to manage the transition of the cable network to the digital technique. This 
consortium was formed by the main telecom and CATV network operators, the TV 
channels, the main concerned industrial firms or service providers, the French- and 
German-speaking authorities and the main French-speaking universities. As a technical 
group, this association has realized major advances by conducing technical studies on 
five domains: services, decoding terminal, networks, financing and contacts, and legal 
aspects (TITAN, 1993:29). 
Contrary to the Telenet group, this consortium has never abandoned its status of 
non-lucrative association to form a financial structure in order to develop a new stra- 
tegic network offer on the Belgian market. Many reasons explain this inertia. Once 
again, the first reason is the crucial lack of killing applications that could foster the 
alliance between the major players. The second reason concerns the decoding terminal, 
the remaining uncertainty about the standard choice and subsequently the lack of 
commercial plans for the production and diffusion of this terminal. The third reason is 
the inability of the southern CATV operators to elaborate a real and coherent strategy 
due to their high fragmentation but also to the relative weakness of their management 
resources. The last reason is the lack of private investment to dynamize the strategy, 
especially investments coming from media and press companies. 
The second French-speaking initiative, starting from the telecom world, was proposed 
in June 1995 by the Minister-President of the Walloon Region. This initiative set up a 
Telecom studies’ syndicate, the Syndicat des TClCcoms. This group gathered Belgacom, 
all the French-speaking Belgian CATV operators and the investment society of the 
Walloon Region (SRIW). The aim of the Syndicat des T&corns is to draw up an 
inventory of all existing infrastructures in the Walloon Region and to design scenarios 
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for network developments able to support market-oriented multimedia services. The 
Syndicate also has to assess the necessary investments and to design a legal frame- 
work. Unfortunately, the results of the group’s research are confidential. But it shows 
that the Telenet Vlaanderen project has had a stimulating effect on the French-speak- 
ing part of the country. 
Like TITAN, the Syndicat des Tel&corns never transformed into an economic hold- 
ing offering new services or a new infrastructure in the Walloon Region. Because of the 
difficulty of setting-up a federal and economically viable project and of proposing a 
coherent strategy, especially in the face of the competitive satellite offer, Wallonia 
seems to be an open battlefield where Belgacom, CATV operators, and other new 
entrants will meet in disorganized order. 
Concerning R&D in the Walloon Region, the regional minister in charge of research 
and technological development has launched, in June 1996, an “impulsional program” 
for the development of innovative multimedia applications in the Walloon Region 
called “From Digital to Multimedia”. This 3-year program, from 1997 to 1999, of 
BF700 million (US$23.33 million), answers the call from Martin Bangemann for a 
clear political sign from European member states concerning the impulse to the devel- 
opment of multimedia services in the framework of ISHs. This program has been 
designed with the users and providers of content and infrastructure through 6 months of 
actors’ hearings. “From Digital to Multimedia” seems radically oriented towards pro- 
duct innovation, new services, social demand but also towards the market and will be 
supported by three technological poles: TCP/IP technologies and on-line services, 
MPEG technologies and services, and off-line technologies and services (like CD-Rom). 
ANALYSIS OF THE BELGIAN SITUATION 
The Belgian debate: a purely academic one 
As quoted before, the Bangemann report did not give rise to important public 
debates about societal issues of ISHs in Belgium. This reflects a general attitude of 
Belgium towards European initiatives. This attitude cannot be characterized as reactive 
or proactive but really passive; Belgium usually follows the major European policies. 
But this reflects also the highly fragmented political scene of Belgium and its inability 
to raise fundamental and societal questions, mainly because of various and contra- 
dictory interests of major involved political players. The sole visible public debate on 
ISHs in Belgium concerns the concept of universal service. But as already pointed out, 
this debate is not dynamized by some democratic intentions but by pure games of 
political interests. 
However, there has been a kind of societal debate about the Bangemann report but it 
remains purely academic.2’ This debate has focused on two main issues. The first issue 
raised by academics concerns the ideology and the strong technological determinism of 
the Bangemann report. This report intends to position the ISHs as a radical innova- 
tion, a move towards a radical change of society, the so-called “information 
society”. Presented as a new industrial revolution, the information society “has the 
2’Mainly via seminars and workshops organized by universities [e.g., the four seminars proposed from 
November 95 to February 96 by CITA, an interdisciplinary center specializing in the assessment of informa- 
tion and communication technologies (http://www.info.fundp.ac.be/-bvb/SemAI.html)]. 
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potential to improve the quality of life of Europe’s citizens, the efficiency of our 
social and economic organization and to reinforce cohesion” (EC, 1994:6). These 
Utopian statements were widely denounced by some academics (Delhaye, Lobet-Maris, 
& van Bastelaer, 1996). First of all, those statements reveal the weakness of European 
policies regarding the resolution of current major social and economic issues. These 
issues need political solutions which are dramatically absent on the European scene. 
Secondly, some academics read this report as a “societal” claim to support major 
investments into the European telecommunication industries and to accelerate the 
liberalization agenda. To some extent, the Bangemann report is analyzed as a new 
“societal costume” to defend an old European telecommunication policy: the 80s 
ISDN option and the telecommunication sector liberalization. 
The second issue is related to employment which appears as a central factor to 
legitimate new telecommunication investments. Two main statements support this 
strategy in the Bangemann report: the Minitel analogy and the innovation approach. 
Concerning the Minitel analogy, Burgelman (1995) pointed out that the very liberal 
approach of the Bangemann report recommends not to do what has made Minitel 
successful. Indeed, Minitel is a state innovation and its success must be analyzed 
regarding the major role played jointly by the national telecom carrier and the French 
government in shaping this innovation (Delhaye, Lobet-Maris, & van Bastelaer, 1996). 
The second criticism is related to the innovation approach. The Bangemann report 
(EC, 1994) and the White Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment (EC, 
1993) expressed the conviction of remarkable positive effect of ISHs on employment 
due to “the enormous potential for new services relating to production, consumption, 
culture and leisure activities” (EC, 1994:4). This conviction is not shared by some aca- 
demics for various reasons. 
First of all, the Bangemann approach is clearly oriented towards infrastructure issues 
though job creation is highly dependent on the development of new markets based on 
radical product or service innovations (Delhaye, Lobet-Maris, & van Bastelaer, 1996). 
On this point, the Bangemann report is short of convictions. The 10 applications quo- 
ted in the report to launch the information society concern mainly process innovation 
and not radical product innovation. The current reserve of major players to invest in 
broadband infrastructure can be explained by the uncertainty of the return on invest- 
ment, since real killing applications are still missing. Even if a market of new multi- 
media services and products emerges, the net effect on job creation will probably not be 
as important as expressed by the White Paper and the Bangemann report. For instance, 
the White Paper states that the French Minitel has directly created 350,000 jobs, while 
other reports speak about a net creation of 25,000 jobs (Thery, 1994). 
Secondly, the liberal approach promoted in the report has proved by crude examples 
that it is more destructive than creative as far as employment is concerned. British 
Telecom’s extensive redundancies are still in memory. A European report on the employ- 
ment effects of telecom liberalization will be published at the end of 1996 by DG V and 
the High-Level Group of Experts, and the already existing conclusions are strongly 
negative. Other major issues raised in this academic debate concern mainly the cohesion 
of Europe and the risk to create a two-tier society of information have and have-nots. 
The weakness of the federalpattern for the development of a global information society 
The lack of societal public debates in Belgium is probably due to the dominance of a 
strong conflict of competences between main political authorities. To some extent and 
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in opposition to Bangemann’s statements, the Belgian example reveals the weakness of 
a federal state in defining and managing a coherent ISH strategy. This issue can be 
analyzed as a pure technical one since, as quoted before, the convergence between 
telecommunications and CATV and the regulation of the new multimedia sector are 
hard to manage regarding the traditional division of responsibilities. Starting with this 
perception of the problem, legal experts try to set up different institutional mechanisms 
pointing out the necessity to create a unique state department in charge of ISHs 
(Willems, Gerard, Poullet, & Queck, 1995). Even if this process of federal reengi- 
neering seems rational from a pure technical point of view, it has little chance to 
succeed since the problem is more political than simply technical. In Belgium, the 
ISH project contributes to crystallize, on a new domain of political interest, deep 
tensions and conflicts about the state reform and its political fragility. Since the 
Bangemann report’s publication, ISHs in Belgium became a sort of battlefield coa- 
gulating long-lasting oppositions between centrifugal forces originating from strong 
regionalist strategies and centripetal pressures defending the state’s federal organi- 
zation. These oppositions very clearly show the limits of the technological deter- 
minism of the Bangemann report stating that ISHs will be a central vector of the 
European cohesion. The very small Belgian scene does not bring any empirical 
evidence to this statement. 
A market-driven approach: success or failure? 
For the development of the European information society, the Bangemann 
report underlines the necessity of a market-driven approach whose efficiency has 
since been questioned (Burgelman, 1995; Delhaye, Lobet-Maris, & van Baste- 
laer, 1996). In the Belgian case, this approach is facing difficulties because the 
market does not seem to answer the Bangemann call. This relative market 
inertia can be explained by the uncertainty about the real return on investment 
on new infrastructures, due to the absence of killing applications that could 
justify these investments. However, this lack of killing applications is not spe- 
cific to the Belgian market but could be found in neighboring countries (Torres, 
1994). 
This inertia implies that ISHs can only be pushed by a strong willful political strat- 
egy and important public fundings. This raises two major issues. The first one ques- 
tions the funding capacity of the state. The Belgium case of contrasted strategies 
between the northern and richer part of the country and the southern area shows 
obviously that this primary condition could lead to a two-tier European society 
between rich and poor member states and, even into a same state, between rich and 
poor regions. The comparison between the Flemish and Walloon Regions’ policies 
brings some empirical evidence and reveals that ISHs could foster regional dis- 
parities. But this raises also crucial questions about the value and the motivation 
supporting public intervention. The Belgian case and more precisely the Flemish 
policies show that this intervention can be dynamized by other concerns than purely 
economic ones. The shaping of ISHs can be strongly marked by important motiva- 
tions of competition and affirmation of regional identities. These trends indicate that 
ISHs may increase competition between regions and, later regional disparities. The 
tone of the Bangemann report stresses by itself this competition when stating that 
“the first countries to enter the information society will reap the greatest rewards” 
(EC, 19945). 
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Regional identities and cohesion 
While the Bangemann report stresses that ISHs will provide opportunities to express 
regional identities and culture but also lead to Europe’s cohesion and allow the con- 
struction of a European information society, the Belgian case shows obviously that 
expression of regional identities appears to be contradictory with a greater cohesion. 
The Belgian example underlines the difficulty to build a Belgian information society as 
the concept of society does not seem to have any political concrete content or reality. 
At a more general level, it also questions the ambition of setting up a European infor- 
mation society and perhaps also reveals the difficulty of building a European society 
while respecting regional identities. The Bangemann report pointed out that “the only 
question is whether information highways will be a strategic creation for the whole 
Union, or a more fragmented and less effective amalgam of individual initiatives by 
Member states” (EC, 1994:5). The Belgian case seems to confirm the more pessimistic 
hypothesis. 
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